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Abstract
Between Keynes’s verbalized theory and its formal basis persists a lacuna.
The conceptual groundwork is too small and not general. The quest for a
comprehensive formal basis is guided by the question: what is the minimum
set of foundational propositions for a consistent reconstruction of the money
economy? We start with three structural axioms. The claim of generality
entails that it should be possible to prove that Keynes’s formalism is a subset
of the structural axiom set. The axioms are applied to a central part of the
General Theory in order to achieve consistency and generality.
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The Keynesian Revolution was intended as both, a radical change of economic policy
and a groundbreaking paradigm shift. Keynes left no doubt about the scientific
scope of the General Theory:
The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-
Euclidean world . . . . Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except to throw
over the axiom of parallels and to work out a non-Euclidean geometry.
Something similar is required to-day in economics. (Keynes, 1973, p.
16)
While the political impact of Keynes’s ideas surpassed that of his precursors by
several magnitudes, the policy proposals themselves had already been popular in the
economic literature of the 1930s (Laidler, 1999, p. 10). The ratification of Keynes’s
scientific claims therefore depends on the question whether he was successful in
formulating some kind of non-Euclidean economic theory. By invoking Euclid,
Keynes committed himself to the methodological consensus since Adam Smith
(Hollander, 1977) and Senior:
It [the axiomatic method] was introduced to economics in A.D. 1836 by
Nassau William Senior in his Outline of the Science of Political Econ-
omy and is today more or less consciously adopted by most economic
theorists as the way of theorizing in economics. (Stigum, 1991, p. 4)
Euclid’s path runs through the classical school (Halévy, 1960, p. 494) the neoclassi-
cal school (Jevons, 1911, p. 21), to reach a new level of Walrasian abstraction in the
1960s (Debreu, 1959, p. x). The salient point of axiomatization is also recognized
by some Post Keynesians:
. . . , before accepting the conclusions of any economist’s model as
applicable to the real world, the careful student should always examine
and be prepared to criticize the applicability of the fundamental pos-
tulates of the model; for, in the absence of any mistake in logic, the
axioms of the model determine its conclusions. (Davidson, 2002, p.
41), see also (1996, p. 49), (1998, p. 68), (2005, p. 402)
But Euclid’s path seems not really carry forward to Keynesianism. Yet one cannot
not axiomatize. J. S. Mill clearly enunciated the question that stands at the beginning
of any and every scientific inquiry:
What are the propositions which may reasonably be received without
proof? That there must be some such propositions all are agreed, since
there cannot be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended from
nothing. But to determine what these propositions are, is the opus
magnum of the more recondite mental philosophy. (Mill, 2006, p. 746),
original emphasis
Keynes’s critique of orthodox economics therefore rightly aimed at the premises:
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For if orthodox economics is at fault, the error is to be found not in
the superstructure, which has been erected with great care for logical
consistency, but in a lack of clearness and of generality in the premises.
(Keynes, 1973, p. xxi)
Hence the question arises: why did Keynes not heed his own appeal and in earnest
worked out the required non-Euclidean formal basis? Not the least advantage
of axiomatization is that it serves efficiency and in Keynes’s case it would have
precluded the question ‘what Keynes really meant’. There can be no conclusive
answer because ‘Keynes, too, sometimes gave the impression of not having fully
grasped the logic of his own system’ (Laidler, 1999, p. 281).
Keynes’s conceptual groundwork consists in the main of two equations (Y=C+I
and S=Y–C, ergo I=S, Keynes, 1973, p. 63). That formal basis is too small and
contains quite a number of tacit assumptions. The conjunction between the income
and saving equation to, for example, wage rate, price, output, profit, or money is
formally opaque (Heilbroner and Milberg, 1995, p. 52). That is the specific thesis
with regard to Keynes’s approach.
The general thesis says that human behavior does not yield to the axiomatic
method, yet the axiomatization of the money economy’s fundamental structure
is feasible. By choosing objective structural relationships as axioms behavioral
hypotheses are not ruled out. On the contrary, the structural axiom set is open to
any behavioral assumption and not restricted to the standard optimization calculus.
The objective is to establish a formalism of maximum structural simplicity. We
start with an axiom set that is free of behavioral specifications and subsequently
approach the complexity of the real world by a process of consistent differentiation.
The claim of generality entails that it should be possible to prove that Keynes’s
basic formalism is a subset of the structural axiom set.
We proceed as follows. The formal ground is systematically prepared in sec-
tions 1 to 3. The structural axiom set represents the pure consumption economy. In
sections 4 to 6 the structural employment equation is derived and the full employ-
ment conditions are established. After the introduction of the 4th axiom Keynes’s
intermediate situation is modeled as an elementary random economy with employ-
ment dependent, for a start, on the varying market configurations of wage rate and
price. Money, too, follows in direct lineage from the axiom set. In sections 7 to
10 the interrelations of the three aspects: stock of money, quantity of money, and
transaction money are identified. In sections 11 to 14 the definitions of profit and
saving are introduced. The distinction between profit and distributed profit on the
one hand and the relation between retained profit and saving on the other is crucial
for the analysis of the functioning of the money economy. Standard profit theory
is known to be incoherent (Desai, 2008), hence a new conceptual approach is in
order. The structural axiom set is then applied to consistently establish the relation
between investment and saving. In the final part, sections 15 to 20, Keynes’s formal
flaws, which are still with us, are precisely untangled. Section 21 concludes.
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1 Axioms
The first three axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in a period of
arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is conveniently
assumed to be the calendar year. It can be shown that the applicability of the axiom
set does not depend on the chosen period length. Simplicity demands that we have
for the time being one world economy, one firm, and one product. Quantitative and
qualitative differentiation is obviously the next logical step after having worked out
the implications of the following three axioms.1
Total income of the household sector Y is the sum of wage income, i.e. the
product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the product
of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
O = RL |t (2)
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X.
C = PX |t (3)
A set of axioms cannot be assessed ex ante, because the full range of implica-
tions is not immediately transparent. Self-evidence is neither necessary nor sufficient
(Popper, 1980, pp. 71-72). Therefore, a set of axioms is either agreed upon as a ten-
tative formal starting point or prematurely rejected out of hand. The assessment of
axioms comes at the second stage with the interpretation of the logical implications
of the formal world and the comparison with selected data and phenomena of the
real world. Axioms should have an intuitive economic interpretation (von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 2007, p. 25), (Chick, 1998, pp. 1860-1861). The economic
meaning is rather obvious for the set of structural axioms. What deserves mention
is that total income in (1) is the sum of wage income and distributed profit and not
of wage income and profit. Profit and distributed profit are quite different things
that have to be thoroughly kept apart.
2 Definitions
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms (Boylan and
O’Gorman, 2007, p. 431). With (4) wage income YW and distributed profit income
YD is defined:
1 Differentiation ultimately leads to a structural axiomatic theory of value. For details see (2011d, pp.
5-7).
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YW ≡WL YD ≡ DN |t (4)
With (5) the expenditure ratio rE, the sales ratio rX, the distributed profit ratio
rD, and the factor cost ratio rF is defined:
ρE ≡ CY ρX ≡
X
O
ρD ≡ YDYW ρF ≡
W
PR
|t (5)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical
context of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
3 Nothing simpler than that
The axioms and definitions are consolidated to one single equation:
ρF ρE (1+ρD)
ρX
= 1 |t (6)
The period core (6) as the absolute formal minimum determines the interde-
pendencies of the measurable key ratios for each period. The period core is purely
structural, i.e. free of any behavioral assumptions, unit-free because all real and
nominal dimensions cancel out,2 and contingent. Contingency means that it is
open until explicitly stated which of the variables are independent and which is
dependent. The form of (6) precludes any notion of causality; it simply states the
interdependence of the key ratios. The period core represents the pure consumption
economy, that is, no investment expenditures, no foreign trade, and no taxes or any
other state activity.
The factor cost ratio rF summarizes the internal conditions of the firm. A value
of rF <1 signifies that the real wage is lower than the productivity or, in other words,
that unit wage costs are lower than the price, or in still other words, that the value of
output exceeds the value of input. In this case the profit per unit is positive. Then
we have the conditions in the product market. An expenditure ratio rE =1 indicates
that consumption expenditures are equal to income and a value of rX =1 of the sales
ratio means that the quantities produced and sold are equal in period t or, in other
words, that the product market is cleared. In the special case rE =1 and rX =1 with
market clearing and budget balancing the profit per unit is determined solely by the
distributed profit ratio rD. In one sentence: the period core covers the key ratios
about the firm, the market, and the income distribution and determines their mutual
interdependencies.
2 “This procedure is in accordance with the principle of objectivity requiring that the whole theory
and its interpretations have to be independent of the choice of the units of measurement. And
this requirement is met, if the theory is unit-free, the necessary condition stated in Buckingham’s
P-theorem.” (Schmiechen, 2009, p. 176).
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4 Employment
The first markedly Keynesian relation that follows from the period core (6) is the
structural employment equation:
L =
YD
PR
ρX
ρE
−W
|t (7)
As a purely formal relationship the period core must hold in each period. Its
new form now implies the additional assumption that employment as dependent
variable is determined by the rest of the system. This is an assumption about the
direction of dependency in a system with complex and mutual interrelations and this
add-on assumption is not implied in the axiom set which is clearly open to various
dependency interpretations. Dependency is conceptually different from causality.
The structural employment equation states − with the other variables unaltered in
each case:
(i) An increase of the wage rate leads to higher employment, i.e. to a
lower unemployment rate.
(ii) A price increase is conductive to lower employment.
(iii) Provided that wage rate, price and distributed profit all change with the
same rate (
...
W =
...
P =
...
Y D see section 6) there is no effect on employment.
(iv) If the configuration of price and wage rate changes is such that the
denominator remains unchanged then employment stays where it is, no
matter how large wage rate and price changes are. In this case perfect
wage-price flexibility has no impact on employment (cf. Hahn and
Solow, 1997, p. 134).
(v) An increase of the expenditure ratio rE leads to higher employment. An
expenditure ratio rE>1 presupposes the existence of a banking system
(see section 7).
(vi) A productivity increase leads to lower employment.
(vii) As the difference in the denominator approaches zero employment goes
(formally) off to infinity. This singularity is an implicit property of the
economy as given by the structural axiom set (see section 10).
(viii) Distributed profits exert a positive influence on employment.
Statements (i) to (viii) follow without regress to any behavioral assumptions from
the axiom set and the ‘laws of algebra’ (Shaik, 1980, p. 83). When the axioms
capture reality the logical implications are observable. Equation (7) is the structural
axiomatic counterpart to the Phillips curve and contains the original as special case.
6
With regard to the process of adaptation of employment to changes of the
independent variables (7) implies that the independent variables have to be fixed at
the beginning of the period under consideration. Since the period length is arbitrary
no great distortions arise from this idealization if the length is conveniently chosen.
5 Full employment conditions
The standard key variable for the establishment of full employment is the real
wage W/P which has to fall (Keynes, 1973, p. 17). The structural axiomatic
approach asserts that in the consumption economy employment is determined by
the expenditure ratio rE and the factor cost ratio rF=W/PR of which the real wage is
a constituent. This follows from (7) under the conditions that the product market is
cleared, i.e. rX=1, and that the relation of dividend to wage rate rV is held constant:
L =
DN
PR
ρX
ρE
− W
PR
=
ρV N
ρX
ρE ρF
−1
=
ρV N
1
ρE ρF
−1
if ρX = 1; ρV ≡ DW |t (8)
According to (8) employment depends in the pure consumption economy on
the relation of consumption expenditures to income rE, i.e. the axiomatic version of
Keynes’ effective demand (Keynes, 1973, pp. 23-24),3 (Kaldor, 1988, p. 153) and
the outcome of the market price mechanism, i.e. the relation of wage rate, price,
and productivity rF.
Under the conditions that the product market is cleared, i.e. rX=1, and the
household sector’s budget is balanced, i.e. rE=1, a higher factor cost ratio rF means
higher employment as shown in Figure 1. The curve entails that there is no such
thing as a natural rate of unemployment.
There exists a unique factor cost ratio rF*, and by consequence a unique real
wage, that is consistent with full employment (however defined). From (8) follows
as desideratum that condition (9) is satisfied:
ρ∗F =
1
ρV N
L∗
+1
or
(
W
P
)∗
=
R
ρV N
L∗
+1
if ρX = 1; ρE = 1 |t (9)
The numerical value of L* depends on the actual definition of full employment.
If (9) is satisfied the product and the labor market is cleared and the budget is
balanced. Since this result follows without regress to behavioral hypotheses directly
from the axioms it would be conceptually inappropriate to refer to this configuration
as full employment equilibrium. Equilibrium would in addition require some
3 The explicit inclusion of the consumption function determines the expenditure ratio as follows:
rE=a/Y+b.
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Figure 1: Structural relationship between factor cost ratio and employment (rE=1)
behavioral mechanism that guarantees that rF speedily approaches rF*. No such
mechanism is known.
The point to emphasize is: since the structure that is given by the axiom set
does not adapt to behavior, behavior has to adapt to structure. For the economy as a
whole the behavioral real-wage/marginal-productivity condition is inapplicable and
has to give way to (9).
In the general case, the expenditure ratio rE is different from unity and the
condition for full employment reads:
ρFρE =
1
ρV N
L∗
+1
if ρX = 1 |t (10)
Full employment, then, can be realized with any combination of the expenditure
ratio and the factor cost ratio that satisfies (10)4 which in turn entails both, Keynes’s
principle of effective demand and the outcome of the market price mechanism.
In order to establish full employment business has to accept a lower profit ratio.
This ratio follows from (24) in section 11 as:
ρQ ≡ 1ρF −1 ⇐ ρQ ≡
∆Q f i
WL
if ρX = 1 |t (11)
It can be said, then, that full employment is not prevented by a ‘high’ wage rate
W or a ‘high’ real wage W/P but by a ‘high’ profit ratio rQ. It is the profit ratio that
has to fall as long as there is unemployment in the pure consumption economy.
4 If rX=1, rF=1, and rE=1 then rD=0, i.e. YD=0, according to (6). In this case employment is
indeterminate.
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An increase of the wage rate lowers the profit ratio and thus necessitates an
employment expansion to realize the same absolute amount of profit. The general
relationship between total profit and the factor cost ratio follows from (24) in section
11 in combination with the employment equation (7) and is given by:
∆Q f i ≡ 1−ρF
1
ρE
−ρF
YD if ρX = 1 |t (12)
If the expenditure ratio rE is unity then the effects of a higher factor cost ratio
(lower profit ratio) are always exactly compensated by a higher employment and
the overall impact on total profit is nil if distributed profits remain constant. With
regard to total profit business could in this case be indifferent between different
employment levels. If the relation between dividend and wage rate rV is kept
constant, as in (8), then both distributed profit and profit rise and fall with the wage
rate, i.e. YD= (rV N)W.
The counter-intuitive property (from the accustomed perspective) of the employ-
ment equation is that a wage rate reduction, which lowers the real wage and raises
the unit profit ratio, coincides with lower employment. This dissonance between
standard behavioral assumptions and structural fact explains why the usual recipe
for more employment does not succeed in getting the economy out of a slump (Lei-
jonhufvud, 1967, p. 402). The microeconomic optimization calculus and Marshall’s
pair of demand/supply scissors – designed for the isolated partial market – simply
do not apply to the economy as a whole (for details see 2011h). When behavioral
and structural logic are at odds, behavioral logic is conductive to frustrated plans
and expectations. Neoclassical prescriptions deteriorate the situation.
6 The intermediate situation
The period values of the variables are connected formally by the familiar growth
equation, which is added to the structural set as the 4th axiom:
Zt = Zt−1 (1+
...
Z ) Z |W, P, R, ρE (13)
The path of the representative variable Zt , which stands here for wage rate, price,
productivity, and the expenditure ratio, is then determined by the initial value Z0
and the rates of change
...
Z t for each period:
Zt = Z0 (1+
...
Z 1)(1+
...
Z 2) . . .(1+
...
Z t) = Z0
t
∏
t=1
(1+
...
Z t) (14)
Equation (14) describes the paths of the variables with the rates of change as
unknowns. These unknowns are in need of determination and explanation. Since
we do not wish to get involved into speculations about human behavior at this stage,
we have to choose the random hypothesis because:
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Figure 2: Keynes’s intermediate situation (with no singularities)
The simplest hypothesis is that variation is random until the contrary
is shown, the onus of the proof resting on the advocate of the more
complicated hypothesis . . . (Kreuzenkamp and McAleer, 1995, p. 12)
By feeding the employment equation with random rates of change for wage rate and
price (1.000 changes between 0% and 0.4%) employment in this simple random
economy5 develops over time as shown in Figure 2. Since all other variables are
kept constant employment changes depend alone on changes of the real wage. Real
wage and employment are positively related (cf. Hahn and Solow, 1997, p. 136).
In the chosen simulation employment remains within a corridor with the lower
bound defined as intolerable unemployment and the upper bound defined as capacity
limit. Full employment is somewhere in between. Keynes characterized the situation
as follows:
In particular, it is an outstanding characteristic of the economic system
in which we live that, whilst it is subject to severe fluctuations in respect
of output and employment, it is not violently unstable. . . . Fluctuations
may start briskly but seem to wear themselves out before they have
proceeded to great extremes, and an intermediate situation which is
neither desperate nor satisfactory is our normal lot. (Keynes, 1973, pp.
249-250)
In structural axiomatic terms our normal lot is explained by the probability that
employment stays within the corridor. Yet this probability is not unity. There
5 The term random economy has been introduced for the equilibrium analysis of pure exchange
economies (Föllmer, 1974). It is adopted in the present paper without this specific connotation. For a
full account of the pure structural random economy see (2011c).
10
is a positive probability for a singularity, that is, employment may formally go
off to infinity and actually press against the capacity limit for a longer time span.
A situation that is prone to inflation (see section 10). And there is a positive
probability that employment falls below the tolerable level of unemployment (in
whatever sense). The probability for the intermediate situation therefore depends on
the width of the corridor and the fluctuations of the real wage, that is, on the relative
magnitudes of the random rates of change of wage rate and price (Leijonhufvud,
2009, p. 750).
The invisible hand takes effect trough the law of large numbers and there is
no such thing as full employment equilibrium. There is no disequilibrium either.
The intermediate situation becomes more complex, of course, when all independent
variables of the employment equation vary at random. But this does not alter the
fundamental structural fact that the probability for the intermediate situation is
below unity. This in turn implies that the economy cannot always left to herself.
7 Money
The money economy is the real economy. The dichotomization of the real and
the monetary sphere is the central point of Keynes’s methodological critique of
orthodox economics:
The division of economics between the theory of value and distribution
on the one hand and the theory of money on the other hand is, I think,
a false division. (Keynes, 1973, p. 293)
Therefore, the first task is to show how money consistently follows from the given
axiom set (for details see 2011e and 2011f).
If income is higher than consumption expenditures the household sector’s stock
of money increases. It decreases when the expenditure ratio rE is greater than unity.
The change of the household sector’s money stock in period t is defined as:
∆MH ≡ Y −C ≡ Y (1−ρE) |t (15)
The stock of money at the end of an arbitrary number of periods is defined as the
numerical integral of the previous changes of the stock plus the initial endowment:
MH ≡
t
∑
t=1
∆MHt +MH0 (16)
The changes in the stock of money as seen from the business sector are symmet-
rical to those of the household sector:
∆MB ≡C−Y ≡ Y (ρE −1) |t (17)
The business sector’s stock of money at the end of an arbitrary number of
periods is accordingly given by:
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MB ≡
t
∑
t=1
∆MBt +MB0 (18)
To simplify matters here it is supposed that all financial transactions are carried
out without costs by the central bank. The stock of money then takes the form of
current deposits or current overdrafts (Wicksell, 1936, p. 70). Initial endowments
can be set to zero. Then, if the household sector owns current deposits according to
(16) the current overdrafts of the business sector are of equal amount according to
(18) and vice versa if the business sector owns current deposits. Money and credit
are symmetrical. The current assets and liabilities of the central bank are equal by
construction. From its perspective the quantity of money at the end of an arbitrary
number of periods is given by the absolute value either from (16) or (18):
Mt ≡
∣∣∣∣∣ t∑t=1∆Mt
∣∣∣∣∣ if M0 = 0 (19)
The quantity of money thus follows directly from the axioms and this implies
for the time being that the central bank plays an accommodative role. Thus it is not
necessary for the firms and households to resort to funds that have been accumulated
before period1 and we can postpone the question of how the firms finance their
operations (Lavoie, 1992, p. 153). The central bank provides elastic currency
roughly in accordance with the definition of the Federal Reserve Act: ‘Currency
that can, by the actions of the central monetary authority, expand or contract in
amount warranted by economic conditions’.
8 Endogenous and neutral
By sequencing the initially given period length of one year into months the idealized
transaction pattern that is displayed in Figure 3 results (cf. Schmitt, 1996, p. 134).
At the end of each subperiod the stock of money is zero. For the expenditure ratio in
period1 rE=1 holds. In period2 the wage rate, the dividend and the price is doubled.
Since no cash balances are carried forward from one period to the next, there results
no real balance effect provided the doubling takes place exactly at the beginning of
period2.
From the perspective of the central bank it is a matter of indifference whether
the household or the business sector owns current deposits. Therefore the pattern of
Figure 3 translates into an average amount of current deposits. This average stock
of transaction money depends on income according to the transaction equation
MT ≡ κY |t (20)
which resembles Pigou’s Cambridge equation.
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Figure 3: Transaction pattern for a doubling of nominal income in two periods
For the transaction pattern that is here assumed as an idealization the index is
1/48. Different transaction patterns are characterized by different numerical values
of the transaction pattern index.
Taking the definitions of the sales ratio rX and the expenditure ratio rE from (5)
one gets the the explicit transaction equation:
[i] MT ≡ κ ρXρE RLP [ii]
MT
P
≡ κO if ρX = 1; ρE = 1 |t (21)
We are now in the position to substantiate the notions of elastic currency and
accommodation as a money-growth formula. According to [i] the central bank
enables the average stock of transaction money to expand or contract with the
development of productivity, employment, and price. In other words, the real
average stock of transaction money, which is a statistical artifact and not a physical
stock, is proportional to output [ii] if the transaction index is given and if the ratios
rE and rX are unity. Under these initial conditions money is endogenous (Desai,
1989, p. 150), (Nell, 1991, p. 187) and neutral (Patinkin, 1989a) in the structural
axiomatic context. Money emerges from autonomous market transactions and has
three aspects: stock of money, quantity of money (here M=0 at period end, cf.
Graziani, 1996, p. 143) and average stock of transaction money (here MT>0). The
quantity of money changes as soon as rE 6=1, i.e. with saving or dissaving. Then the
function of a store of value is activated.
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9 Transaction money
The average stock of transaction money is given by (21). Taking the employment
equation (7) into account, the definition of the average stock of transaction money
boils down to what may be referred to as augmented transaction equation:
MT ≡ κ (ρV N)
1
W
− ρE
PR
≡ (ρV N)W
1−ρEρF if ρX = 1 |t (22)
From this relation follows – with all other variables fixed in each case:
(i) An increase of the expenditure ratio rE leads according to (8) to higher
employment and exacts a higher average stock of transaction money
MT according to (22).
(ii) When the rates of change of wage rate and price are identical employ-
ment stays where it is and MT rises. Both, employment and the average
transaction balance remain unaltered if the rate of change of wage rate
and price is zero.
(iii) A wage increase is conductive to higher employment and exacts a
higher MT.
(iv) A price increase leads to a drop of employment and exacts a lower
MT. Under the condition of budget balancing, i.e. rE=1, and market
clearing, i.e. rX=1, the varying configuration of W, P, R, i.e. of rF,
determines the development of the average stock of transaction money.
It is, in principle, possible to have a stable price, a rising stock of transaction money,
wage increases marginally above productivity increases, and increasing employment.
It is equally possible to have a stagflation if the price rises faster than the wage rate.
10 The singularity
There is, though, a pitfall in augmented transaction equation which is shown in
Figure 4. What hits the eye is that there is a point of discontinuity where the average
stock of transaction money goes off to infinity. A glance at (22) reveals that this
happens when the inverse of the expenditure ratio 1/rE is equal to the factor cost
ratio rF. Since both ratios vary independently this point moves unpredictably. The
singularity is the formal point of entry of system immanent risk and rather the
opposite of equilibrium.
While the growth of the average stock of transaction money could go a long way,
the coextensive employment expansion first reaches full employment and eventually
runs against the capacity limit (if the factor cost ratio is increased continuously,
which of course does not occur in the random economy or in the real world). The
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Figure 4: Structural singularity and goal compatible corridor
augmented transaction equation cannot tell us more about what then happens. A new
phenomenon must emerge. The circumstances suggest that the new phenomenon
will be inflation.
What follows, then, for stabilization policy? Granted that the axiom set truly
represents the elementary structure of the money economy, one has to face the
fact that there are two holes in the floor: at the one end of the corridor intolerable
unemployment and at the other a high risk of inflation. Therefore, given enough
random trials, the economy will eventually hit the one hole or the other. This state
of the world requires and justifies discretionary economic policy as soon as the
economy tends to leave the goal compatible corridor. To effectively steer the pure
consumption economy away from both holes it would be necessary to fine-tune the
relation of expenditure ratio, wage rate, and price.
11 Profit
The business sector’s profit in period t is defined with (23) as the difference be-
tween the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with consumption
expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW:6
∆Q f i ≡C−YW |t (23)
In explicit form, after the substitution of (3) and (4), this definition is identical
with that of the theory of the firm:
6 Profits from changes in the value of financial and nonfinancial assets are neglected here. For details
see (2011g, p. 9).
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∆Q f i ≡ PX−WL with ρX = 1 |t (24)
Using the first axiom (1) and the definitions (4) and (5) one gets:
∆Q f i ≡C−Y +YD or ∆Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y |t (25)
In the pure consumption economy profit is greater than zero if the expenditure
ratio rE is >1 or the distributed profit ratio rD is >0, or both. If distributed profit YD
is set to zero, then profit or loss of the business sector is determined solely by the
expenditure ratio. For the business sector as a whole to make a profit consumption
expenditures C have in the simplest case to be greater than wage income YW. So
that profit comes into existence in the pure consumption economy the household
sector must run a deficit at least in one period. This in turn makes the inclusion
of the financial sector mandatory. A theory that does not include at least one bank
that supports the concomitant credit expansion.7 which is covered by (16), cannot
capture the essential features of the market economy (Keynes, 1973, p. 85).
It needs hardly emphasis that in the investment economy the process of profit
generation appears more complex (see 2011g). This does not affect the nature of
profit but simply removes the formal necessity that the households have to incur
a deficit to get the economy going. This is then done by the investing business
sector (see section 16). It is not advisable, though, to tackle the complexities of the
investment economy before the pure consumption economy is fully understood.
12 A cognitive dissonance, but no contradiction
The determinants of profit look essentially different depending on the perspective.
For the firm price P, quantity X, wage rate W, and employment L in (24) appear to
be all important; under the broader perspective of (25) these variables play no role
at all. The profit definition provokes a cognitive dissonance between the micro and
the macro view.
It is of utmost importance that profit ∆Qfi and distributed profit YD is clearly
distinguished. The latter is a flow of income from the business to the household
sector analogous to wage income. By contrast, profit is the difference of flows
within the business sector (Keynes, 1973, p. 23). Profit is not connected to a factor
input. So far, we have labor input as the sole factor of production and wage income
as the corresponding factor remuneration. Since the factor capital is nonexistent
in the pure consumption economy, profit cannot be assigned to it in functional
terms. And since profit cannot be counted as factor income (cf. Knight, 2006, pp.
308-309, Schumpeter, 2008, p. 153), there is no place for it in the theory of income
7 When the purchase of long lived consumption goods, e.g. houses, is correctly subsumed under
consumption expenditures there arises no problem with regard to collateral for the banking industry
and a sound credit expansion may proceed for an indefinite time in the pure consumption economy.
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distribution. This would plainly be a category mistake (for details see 2011a, pp.
8-12).
The individual firm is blind to the structural relationship given by (25). On the
firm’s level profit is therefore subjectively interpreted as a reward for innovation
or superior management skills or higher efficiency or toughness on wages or for
risk taking or capitalizing on market imperfections or as the result of monopolistic
practices. These factors play a role when it comes to the distribution of profits
between firms and these phenomena become visible when similar firms of an
industry are compared. Business does not ‘make’ profit, it redistributes profit. The
case is perfectly clear when there is only one firm. It is a matter of indifference
whether the firm’s management thinks that it needs profit to cover risks or to finance
growth or whether it realizes the profit maximum or not. If the expenditure ratio
is unity and the distributed profit ratio is zero, profit will invariably be zero. The
existence and magnitude of total profit is not explicable by the marginal principle.
Because of this, it is not wise to take the considerations of the individual firm’s
management as analytical starting-point and then to generalize. The microeconomic
approach is inherently prone to the fallacy of composition. The profit definition
entails a cognitive dissonance between micro and macro, but no logical contradiction.
Ab origine total profit is a factor-independent residual (Ellerman, 1986, pp. 61-65).
Under the condition rE=1 profit DQfi must, as a corollary of (25), be equal
to distributed profit YD. The fundamental difference between the two variables is
not an issue in this limiting case. The equality of profit and distributed profit is an
implicit feature of equilibrium models (Patinkin, 1989b, p. 329), (Buiter, 1980, pp.
3, 7). These have no counterpart in reality.
The barter-economic notion of surplus stands in no relation to profit as deter-
mined with definition (23). Neither is the neoclassical equilibrium condition, profit
rate = marginal productivity of capital, applicable in the pure consumption economy
because we have profit but no capital. And, since profit and capital must not be
treated like Siamese Twins, as they have by the classics, the tendency of the profit
rate to fall is also in need of a thorough revision (for details see 2011g, pp. 18-20).
The question of whether in equilibrium profit is zero or not – Walras’s ‘ni béné-
fice ni perte’ – is of no concern within the structural axiomatic framework because
the notion of simultaneous equilibrium is no constituent part of it (cf. Kaldor, 1985,
p. 12). In the general case, profit or loss depends on consumer spending and profit
distribution. If in the limiting case distributed profit in (25) is zero, then any loss of
the business sector must be equal to the saving of the household sector as specified
by (28) in section 14. Since saving is – in the absence of distributed profits – the
exact complement of loss, it must be overcompensated by dissaving within a short
time interval, i.e. rE>1, otherwise the economy faces major challenges. So the
real question is not about the existence of a zero-profit equilibrium, but how the
market economy can, and in fact does, avoid this predicament over a longer time
span (Keynes, 1973, 158-159), (Rotheim, 1981, p. 581).
The definition of profit (23) has another important implication. There is no real
residual that corresponds to the nominal residual profit. Real (O, X) and nominal
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(Y, C) flows are to some degree independent. Profit belongs entirely to the nominal
sphere, in a real model it cannot exist. This is the defining characteristic of what
Keynes termed the entrepreneur economy (Rotheim, 1981, pp. 575, 577, 579).
13 Retained profit
Profits can either be distributed or retained. If nothing is distributed, then profit adds
entirely to the financial wealth of the firm. Retained profit DQre is defined for the
business sector as a whole as the difference between profit and distributed profit in
period t:
∆Qre ≡ ∆Q f i−YD |t (26)
Using (25) and (17) it follows:
∆Qre ≡a C−Y ≡b ∆MB |t (27)
Retained profit DQre is the residual C-Y as it appears at the firm; the same
residual appears at the central bank as a change of the business sector’s stock of
money DMB. The two aspects are kept apart by the notation ≡aand ≡b respectively.
It follows immediately that the development of the business sector’s stock of money,
which may carry a positive or negative sign, is given by (17).
14 Saving
Financial saving is given by (28) as the difference of income and consumption
expenditures.8 This definition is identical with Keynes’s, i.e. DSfi equates to the
Keynesian S. In combination with (15) this yields the straightforward relation:
∆S f i ≡ Y −C ⇒ ∆S f i ≡a Y −C ≡b ∆M¯H (28)
Saving and the change of the household sector’s stock of money are two aspects
of the same flow residual. It follows immediately that the development of the
household sector’s stock of money is thus given by (16). The household sector’s
stock of money is, according to section 7, the zero-sum complement of the business
sector’s stock of money.
Financial saving (28) and retained profit (27) always move in opposite direc-
tions, i.e. ∆Qre ≡−∆S f i. Let us call this the complementarity corollary because it
follows directly from the definitions themselves. The corollary asserts that the com-
plementary notion to saving is not investment but negative retained profit. Positive
retained profit is the complementary of dissaving. Since there is no investment in
the pure consumption economy the IS-equality-identity-equilibrium cannot hold.
8 The 6th axiom states that saving, like profit, has a financial and nonfinancial component. For details
see (2011b, p. 8).
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The complementary corollary entails that the plans of households and firms are not
mutually compatible. Firms cannot escape to another point on their indifference
curve.
15 Allais is general, Keynes is not
Having clarified the structural properties of the pure consumption economy we are
now ready to assess the relation between the axiomatic and the Keynesian approach
in still more detail. Based on the differentiated formalism it is assumed that the
investment goods industry, which consists of one firm, produces OI=XI units of an
investment good, which is bought by the consumption goods industry to be used for
the production of consumption goods in future periods. The households buy but the
output of the consumption goods industry (for the full investment cycle see 2011g).
From (24) then follows for the financial profit of the consumption and investment
goods industry respectively:
∆QC f i ≡C−YCW ∆QI f i ≡ I−YIW |t (29)
Total financial profit, defined as the sum of both industries, is then given by the
sum of consumption expenditures and investment expenditures minus wage income
which is here expressed as the difference of total income minus distributed profit:
∆Q f i ≡C+ I− (Y −YD) |t (30)
From this and the definition of financial saving (28) follows:
∆Q f i ≡ I−∆S f i+YD |t (31)
Higher total financial profits on the one side demand as a corollary, i.e. as
a logical implication of the definition itself, higher investment expenditures and
distributed profits and lower saving on the other side and vice versa. By finally
applying the definition of retained profit (26) the Allais-Identity follows:
∆Qre ≡ I−∆S f i |t (32)
Autrement dit l’investissement n’est pas égal à l’épargne spontanée,
mais à l’épargne spontanée augmenté du revenue non distribué des
entreprises . . . . (Allais, 1993, p. 69), see also (Robinson, 1956, p. 402),
(Lavoie, 1992, p. 159 eq. (4.3))
If retained profit is zero, that is, if profit and distributed profit happen to be equal
in (26), then, as a corollary, investment expenditures and household saving in (32)
must be equal too. Vice versa, if it happens that household saving is equal to
investment expenditure then, as a corollary, profit and distributed profit must be
equal too. In reality, though, profit and distributed profit are virtually never equal
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and correspondingly household saving and investment are not equal either. The
fact that retained profit is different from zero in each period can be taken as an
empirical proof of the logically equivalent inequality of household saving and
business investment. Allais has definitively settled the IS-debate of the 1930s in
1993. Since then, all models (including IS-LM) that have been built and are still
being built on the arguments of (Hicks, 1939, pp. 181-184), (Ohlin, 1937), (Lutz,
1938), (Lerner, 1938), (Keynes, 1973, p. 63), (Kalecki, 1987, p. 138) and others
have to be regarded either as limiting cases or as formally deficient. From the
vantage point of the structural axiom set Keynes is not general, yet Allais is.
16 Treatise and General Theory as limiting cases
When the profit definition for the pure consumption economy [i] in (33) and the
investment economy [ii] is compared
[i] ∆Q f i ≡ YD−∆S f i
[ii] ∆Q f i ≡ I+YD−∆S f i |t (33)
the first point to emphasize is that definition [i] is consistently replaced by the
broader definition [ii]. The inclusion of the investment process significantly changes
the scope of profit generation. This change, though, is opaque to the agents, which
can perceive scarcely more than their firm’s sales revenues and factor costs. For
definition [ii] the corollary holds: if it happens that investment expenditures are zero
then it must be the case that financial profit is equal to the difference of distributed
profit and household saving, and vice versa. The corollary (34) replaces definition
[i] in (33) and now applies to the pure consumption economy as a limiting case:
I = 0⇔ ∆Q f i = YD−∆S f i |t (34)
For definition [ii] a second corollary (35) holds: if it happens that distributed
profit is zero then financial profit must be equal to the difference of investment
expenditures and household sector’s saving:
YD = 0⇔ ∆Q f i = I−∆S f i |t (35)
This implication of [ii] is well known as one of Keynes’s ‘fundamental equations
for the value of money’ (Keynes, 1971, pp. 124, 136). This means that, although
Keynes was closer to the axiomatic formalism in his Treatise than in his General
Theory he nonetheless was not general there either (Hicks, 1939, p. 184). The
reason is that he, in accordance with orthodox economic theory, did not accurately
discriminate between profit and distributed profit and by consequence failed to take
into account the process of profit distribution which is crucial for the functioning
of the market system. The axiomatic argumentation ultimately boils down to the
rejection of Keynes’s definition:
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Thus the factor cost and the entrepreneur’s profit make up, between
them, what we shall define as the total income resulting from the
employment given by the entrepreneur. (Keynes, 1973, p. 23), original
emphasis
Total income consists in the simplest case of wage income and distributed profits.
17 Delicate distinctions
The present formalism is composed of axioms and definitions. In a strictly formal
sense the definitions are dispensable. Any new symbol (definiendum) that is intro-
duced with a definition is an abbreviation for a longer expression (definiens) that is
composed of the variables of the axiom set and the familiar mathematical operators.
So, when the word processor is instructed to replace one definiendum after another
by its definiens then the equations become longer yet nothing else changes. No
variables other than those of the axiom set remain.
Since it is true that everybody is free to define whatever appears to be appropriate
it seems that a definition could not pose any real problem. This, indeed, is not true
because the full freedom of definition holds but for the first definition. For a critique
of the entirely misconceived liberty to assume and define anything in any way
desired see (Boland, 2003, p. 87) or (Hahn, 1984, p. 40).
Let us suppose somebody looks at the Allais-Identity (32), which states that
retained profit for the economy as a whole is equal to the difference of the business
sector’s investment expenditure and the household sector’s financial saving, and
proposes to refer to the sum of saving and retained profit as total private saving S
because retained profit may, after all, well be regarded as saving of the business
sector (e.g. Lavoie, 1992, p. 159). Thereby a new definition, [i] in (36), would be
added to the already existing formalism. Together with the Allais-Identity [ii] this
gives [iii] which states that total private saving S (and not household saving DSfi
respectively S in Keynes’s notation) “equals” investment.
[i] Σ≡ ∆S f i+∆Qre [ii] ∆Qre ≡ I−∆S f i ⇒ [iii] Σ≡ I |t (36)
We thus arrive at an implicit definition that is no proper definition at all:
For a definition to be valid it must meet several conditions: (1) it must
be dispensable, that is, the scientist must be able to do without it; and
(2) it must be noncreative, that is, the scientist cannot use the definition
to establish formulas that do not contain the defined term, unless these
formulas can be proved without using the definition. (Stigum, 1991, pp.
35-36), original emphasis
Equation (36) iii is no dispensable abbreviation but simply permits the arbitrary
permutation of the symbols S and I. While the Allais-Identity contains valuable
information, S≡I≡S is a homespun muddle. To place S for S is in any case faulty.
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But, and this makes things a bit complicated, if it happens that retained profit is
zero in [i] then, as a corollary, it must hold that total private saving S and household
saving DSfi are equal, i.e. S=DSfi. From [ii] then results as a corollary I=DSfi or in
plain words: household sector’s saving equals investment – if retained profit is zero,
which never happens. In contrast, [iii] states that total private saving S is identical
with investment I by definition (cf. Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1998, p. 204 and p.
194 for corporate saving).
A complete resolution of this formally unacceptable state of affairs requires that
he wrong turnoff [i] in (36) is not taken. This definition implicitly leads to [iii]
which signals redundancy. Redundancy calls for Occam’s razor.
Under the purely formal perspective the salient point is: in a system of equations
x=y signifies a condition that is satisfied by certain values of the unknowns; in
a system of definitions x≡y signifies a dead end. The latter expression allows
replacing the word apple wherever it appears by the word orange and vice versa.
From this, no profound insights are to be expected.
18 A look at the ledger
Under the conceptual perspective the salient point is: saving as the complement of
consumption expenditures refers exclusively to the household sector.
It is true, of course, that neoclassical economists also consider total
private saving, defined as the sum of personal and business saving,
since the distinction between households and firms is often treated
as a veil and individual agents are assumed to optimize total private
(rather than merely household) saving. (Gordon, 1995, p. 62), original
emphasis
There is no such thing as saving of the business sector. Introducing or, for that matter,
reiterating the notion of corporate saving in textbooks (Samuelson and Nordhaus,
1998, p. 194) opens the gates to confusion at best and outright error at worst.
Ultimately, the saving-equals-investment formula results in superficial empirical
studies (Gordon, 1995, pp. 60-62) and unacceptable bookkeeping conventions in
national accounting (Eisner, 1995, p. 109), (Wagner, 2009). To demonstrate this,
Figure 5 reconstructs the steps from pure transaction recording to the formally
indefensible and ultimately futile collapsing of the business sector’s retained profit
and the household sector’s saving (cf. Boulding, 1950, pp. 248-252, Levy and Levy,
1983, pp. 44-48). Collapsing is futile because it just annihilates what has been
gained by differentiation and because the result is predictable: all surpluses and
deficits between economic units and all credit relations vanish. The very essence of
economics evaporates.
Conceptual consistency prohibits the application of the notion of saving to
the business sector. The compelling reason for rejecting the definition of total
private saving S in (36), and everything that follows from it, boils down to that it is
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Figure 5: How the accountant produces valuable information and how the economist wastes it (CGI
consumption goods industry, IGI investment goods industry)
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conceptually inadmissible, implicitly leads to S≡I, which signifies redundancy, and
for certain conditions to I=DSfi, which is a limiting case of the Allais-Identity with
no real world correspondence.
19 Never ex ante, never ex post
Needless to emphasize that it did not got lost in the discussion that in fact investment
expenditures might not be equal to household saving and this was explained with
the perfect reconcilability of an ex ante disequilibrium with the ex post bookkeeping
truism I≡S, which in turn is different from the equilibrium condition I=S. This
rationalization is beside the point for the simple reason that a meticulous recording of
all transactions during one period arrives at the Allais-Identity. Only after applying
the indefensible definition of total private saving S the national accountant will
arrive at I≡S (with S being different from S). These extra entries are formally
redundant. The ex ante/ex post-story, or, for that matter, the designed/undesigned-
story (Heilbroner, 1942, p. 828) fits the prevailing mode of ‘loose verbal reasoning’
(Dennis, 1982, p. 698) that cares not much for conceptual consistency. All that is
necessary, then, is to add up the available numbers and to abstain from redundant
definitions.
20 Set and subset − Q.E.D.
Keynes’s characterization of the ‘nature of economic thinking’ (Keynes, 1973, p.
297) may be rhetorically summed up to: better vaguely right (ordinary discourse)
than precisely wrong (blind manipulation of symbols). This alternative does not
exist, at least not in science. Keynes recognized that without formal principles of
thought ‘we shall be lost in the wood’ and struggled in Book II with fundamental
definitions and ideas. He finally came up with equations [i*], which follows from
(29), and [v] in (37).
Axioms Definitions
[i] Y =WL+DN [iv] ∆Q f i ≡ PX−WL
[ii] O = RL [v] ∆S f i ≡ Y −C
[iii]C = PX
[i∗] Y =C+ I if DN = ∆Q f i
(37)
The structural axiomatic approach rests on the three axioms [i]-[iii] that capture
the elementary facts of a money economy. It formally reduces to Keynes’s limiting
case [i*] and [v] if profit is exactly equal to distributed profit which, obviously, does
not happen in the real world.
Keynes’s main concern in the General Theory was not market or policy failure
but theory failure. By consequence he envisioned nothing less than a paradigm
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shift (Coddington, 1976) and called for a ‘complete theory of a monetary economy’
(Keynes, 1973, p. 293), see also (Dillard, 2010). While perfectly aware that
this at the same time required a consistent set of some kind of non-Euclidean
axioms, Keynes had no desire that the particular forms of his ‘comparatively simple
fundamental ideas . . . should be crystallized at the present state of the debate’ (cited
in Rotheim, 1981, p. 571). Hahn’s balanced view, though, might be closer to the
mark:
I consider that Keynes had no real grasp of formal economic theorizing
(and also disliked it), and that he consequently left many gaping holes
in his theory. I none the less hold that his insights were several orders
more profound and realistic than those of his recent critics. (Hahn,
1982, pp. x-xi)
From all this follows:
We are not time-locked by the particular (and provisional) choice
Keynes made in expositing his ideas in 1936. (O’Donnell, 1997, p.
158)
Or, as Joan Robinson once said with regard to standard economics: Scrap the lot
and start again.
21 Conclusions
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper suggests three non-behavioral axioms as groundwork for the
formal reconstruction of the evolving money economy.
The analytical priority claim of the structural axiomatic approach rests on the
simple fact that, since the structure that is given by the axiom set does not adapt to
behavior, behavior has to adapt to structure. When behavioral and structural logic
are at odds, behavioral logic is conductive to frustrated plans and expectations. That
is the normal state of economic affairs. The main results of the inquiry are:
• The expenditure-income asymmetry is the indispensable prerequisite for
favorable business conditions and prolonged growth. This holds for the
elementary consumption economy and the complex investment economy in
equal measure.
• The key variables for the attainment of full employment are the expenditure
ratio rE, i.e. the axiomatic version of Keynes’ effective demand, and the
factor cost ratio rF, i.e. the configuration of wage rate, price, and productivity
as outcome of the market price mechanism.
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• There is no structural trade-off between higher price inflation and lower
unemployment.
• The employment effect depends on the relative magnitude of wage rate and
price changes.
• Higher employment is compatible with a higher real wage, a lower unit profit
ratio and unaltered profit for the business sector as a whole.
• Models that are based on the collapsed definition total income ≡ wages +
profits are erroneous because profit and distributed profit is not the same
thing.
• The structural axiom set implies that it is possible to have a stable price, a ris-
ing stock of transaction money, wage increases marginally above productivity
increases, and rising employment.
• There is no such thing as a natural rate of unemployment and it is not a ‘high’
nominal or real wage that prevents full employment but a ‘high’ unit profit
ratio.
• The structural axiom set implies a singularity. A singularity is the point of
entry of systemic risk and rather the opposite of equilibrium.
• Keynes proposed to ‘throw over’ the axioms of the orthodox theorists which
‘resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world’, but failed to heed
his own appeal. His own formal basis is too small, contains too many tacit
assumptions, and is not general.
• The Keynesian formalism is a subset of the structural axiom set. The general
Allais-Identity is confirmed. With regard to all I=S or I≡S models it asserts
that household saving is virtually never equal to investment expenditures,
neither ex ante nor ex post. The standard ex ante/ex post-explanation consists
of multiple logical errors that support one another.
The structural axiomatic approach provides Keynes’s missing axioms and fits the
Keynesian approach consistently into a general context.
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